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SECOND CIRCUIT NOTE, 1972 TERM
Of perhaps greater significance is the court's treatment of the
statutory claims. By broadly construing section 1115, the court has all
but precluded future statutory attacks on "experimental programs"
since the Secretary unquestionably can waive compliance with many
of the federal requirements. When coupled with the narrow scope of
judicial review used by the court it is apparent that a considerable
barrier has been erected to those wishing to attack such programs.
GEOGRAPHICAL CLAsslicATioNs OF WEiAPE DIsnuCTs ATTACKED
City of New York v. Richardson
Pursuant to the system for distribution of funds prescribed by the
Social Security Act of 1935,1 federal funds are made available to the
states on a "matching-fund" basis. Those states choosing to participate
in a program under the Act must submit a plan to the Secretary of
Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) for approval.- New York
State's plan, as outlined in its Social Services Law, divides the state
into a number of welfare districts on a geographic basis. 4 According to
the financing system provided in the statute, each local district is to
pay 25 percent of its welfare costs, with an additional 25 percent con-
tributed by the state. The remaining 50 percent is provided by the
federal government.5
Under New York's Social Services Law, New York City is desig-
nated as a local welfare district." Unfortunately for New York City tax-
payers, the number of welfare recipients in the City is disproportion-
ately high in relation to its population. The City, therefore, bears a
greater welfare burden than do other districts in the State.7
In City of New York v. Richardson,s the City of New York and
142 U.S.C. §§ 801-06, 601-10, 1201-06, 1351-55 (1971).
2 In order for a state plan to be approved, it must comply with the provisions of
the Act and the rules and regulations promulgated by HEW. For example, the state
plan must be in effect "on a statewide basis in accordance with equitable standards for
assistance and administration that are mandatory throughout the state." 45 C..R. § 205.
120(a) (1978).
3 N.Y. Soc. SERv. L § 1 et seq. (McKinney 1966 & Supp. 1972).
4 See N.Y. Soc. SERv. L. § 61 (McKinney 1966).
G See N.Y. Soc. SERv. L. § 153 (McKinney 1966).
0 See N.Y. Soc. SERv. L. § 61(1) (McKinney 1966).
7 Statistics for 1969 reveal that although the residents of New York City comprise
only 45% of the state's population, 74% of the state's public assistance recipients live
within the city. It is also noted that while 3A9% of the state's residents outside New York
City receive public assistance, within the City, 12.52% of the population receive such
aid. See City of New York v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 923, 930 (2d Cir. 1973).
8473 F.2d 923 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 41 U.S.L.W. 3655 (U.S. June 18, 1973) (No.
72-1451).
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three individual plaintiffs9 mounted a "broadside constitutional at-
tack" 10 upon the provisions of the federal Social Security Act and the
New York Social Services Law, naming both federal" and state de-
fendants.12 The complaint alleged that the federal-state statutory
scheme violated the equal protection clause and requested declaratory
and injunctive relief. A motion to convene a three-judge district court
was filed in the Southern District of New York. District Judge McLean
denied the motion and dismissed the complaint for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted and for lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter.13
On appeal, the Second Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Kaufman,'14
affirmed the lower court's dismissal of all complaints against the federal
defendants 5 and those claims asserted by the City against the state
9 The individual plaintiffs in the action were John V. Lindsay, Mayor of the City
of New York, Jule Sugarman, Commissioner of Social Services of the City of New York,
and Ola Bryant, a taxpayer and resident of New York City.
10 473 F.2d at 925.
11 Named as federal defendants were the Secretary of HEW, the Secretary of the
Treasury, and two regional officers of HEW.
12 Named as state defendant was the Commissioner of Social Services of the State
of New York .
13 FED. R. CIv. P. 12(b)(1), (6). 473 F.2d at 926 (1973).
14 Judge Kaufman was joined on the panel, and in the decision, by Judges Lumbard
and Mansfield.
15473 F.2d at 927-28. In affirming the district court's dismissal, the Second Circuit
rejected the plaintiff's argument that welfare is a problem of national scope and that
Congress, being obligated to provide for the general welfare, U.S. CoNsT. ART. 1,
§ 8, therefore must bear the burden of financing the program. The court commented
that the Social Security Act was enacted out of a spirit of "'cooperative federalism,'"
473 F.2d at 928. This phrase was first used in King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968), where
the Supreme Court invalidated an Alabama substitute father regulation which deprived
children of aid under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program
if their mother "cohabitates" with a man who is not under a duty to support them.
Plaintiffs' contention that the federal government, having embarked upon a program
of public assistance, was obligated to bear the entire burden of providing such a program
was also rejected. 473 F.2d at 298. The court observed that the consequences of extending
this argument, i.e., demanding that the federal government, whenever it provided some
funds for the implementation of state or local programs, take on the financing of the
entire program, would be monumental because of the many areas in which there is
some degree of federal aid. Id.
Judge Kaufman further pointed out that the present case presented questions some-
what similar to those raised when the Social Security Act was originally promulgated.
At that time, the argument was made that the Act was unconstitutional in that it
authorized federal involvement in an area believed to be the exclusive province of the
states. Id. In Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 526 (1937), the
Supreme Court rejected this argument, holding that:
[T]he two statutes [the Social Security Act and the Unemployment Compensa-
tion Act] . . . embody a cooperative legislative effort by state and national
governments for carrying out a public purpose common to both, which neither
could fully achieve without the cooperation of the other. The Constitution does
not prohibit such cooperation.
See also Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937); Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S.
548 (1937).
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defendant.' 6 The court, however, remanded the actions of the indi-
vidual plaintiffs against the state defendant to the district court, finding
"that the [constitutional] question presented is sufficiently substantial
to merit the convening of a three-judge court." 7
The Second Circuit had heard an appeal only from the denial of
the motion to convene a three-judge court. The Richardson court was,
therefore, not called upon to decide the constitutional issue, but was
required merely to determine whether the request to convene the
three-judge court had been properly denied.' In deciding the ques-
tion, the court acknowledged that its inquiry was limited to a deter-
mination as to "whether the question raised is 'wholly' or 'clearly
insubstantial.' "19
In making this determination, the Richardson court evaluated
plaintiffs' claim that the New York Social Services Law violated the
equal protection clause. Plaintiffs argued that the state's decision to
distribute the financial burden of public assistance on a purely geo-
graphic basis, without regard for the number of welfare recipients in
a given district, constituted a denial of equal protection to the residents
of New York City. It was contended that an inequitable financial
burden is placed on New York City residents, because of the dispro-
portionately high number of welfare recipients within their district.20
The Second Circuit agreed with Judge McLean's finding in the district court where
it was held that: "Mhese decisions axe as good authority for sustaining the statute
against the present attack as they were for rejecting the earlier one. Neither extreme
position is justified." 473 F.2d at 928.
16 473 F.2d at 929. The Second Circuit declared that the City of New York and the
surrounding counties lacked standing to bring the action. As political subdivisions of
the state, they cannot avail themselves of fourteenth amendment guarantees in order
to attack a state statute.
Judge Kaufman relied on the Supreme Court's holding in Williams v. Mayor and
City Council of Baltimore, 289 U.S. 36, 40 (1933), which stated: "A municipal corporation,
created by the state for the better ordering of government, has no privileges or immunities
under the federal constitution which it may invoke in opposition to the will of its
creator."
The Richardson court acknowledged that this rule recently had been challenged in
Aguayo v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 1090 (2d Cir. 1973). There congressional legislation was
involved. Nevertheless, the Richardson court felt the Williams holding was controlling
since the challenge before it was directed at a state statute. 473 F.2d at 929.
17473 F.2d at 931.
18 See 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1971).
19 473 F.2d at 930. See Goosby v. Osser, 409 U.S. 512, 518 (1973); Ex parte Poresky,
290 U.S. 30, 32 (1933); Powell v. Workmen's Compensation Bd., 327 F.2d 131, 138 (2d
Cir. 1964).
Judge Kaufman noted the failure of the state to offer "even a minimally rational
explanation for the statutory discrimination" inherent in the New York statutes, and
declared that this alone "suggests that the question presented is sufficiently substantial
to merit the convening of a three-judge court." 473 F.2d at 931.
20 Id.
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The Richardson court found itself faced with the problem of
selecting the proper standard for evaluating the merits of plaintiffs'
claim, a difficult choice at best.21 Judge Kaufman, after reviewing the
state of equal protection law, adopted the protean "sliding-scale" test.
The court refused to sustain the New York statute although a "'state
of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it' "22 and held that the
constitutional question involved was "sufficiently substantial to merit
the convening of a three-judge court." 23 In so holding, the Richardson
court noted the state's failure even to attempt to establish a rational
justification for its statutory scheme, and observed that the state would
have an opportunity to do so upon remand.2 4
The "sliding-scale" test however seems to have lost favor in the
Supreme Court's recent decision in San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodrigue. 25 There, the Court apparently reverted to the
21 The court noted that the present case involved neither fundamental interests, nor
suspect classifications and that, therefore, the statute would not be subject to "strict
scrutiny." 478 F.2d at 930-31. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 894 U.S. 618 (1969) (inter-
state travel held a fundamental right); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (race deemed
a suspect classification). Under the two-tiered equal protection doctrine, the remaining
test would be the rational basis test whereby any hypothetical justification for the statute
would suffice. However, Judge Kaufman emphasized that the traditional rational basis
standard had been modified by recent Supreme Court decisions. 473 F.2d at 930-31, citing
Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). See generally Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971
Term -Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a
Newer Equal Protection, 86 HIv. L. Ruv. 1 (1972); Note, Legislative Purpose, Rationality
and Equal Protection, 82 YALE L.J. 123 (1972); Comment, Equal Protection in Transition:
An Analysis and a Proposal, 41 FoRa. L. REv. 605 (1973). The court concluded that a
third, intermediary test was evolving where the state had the burden of showing that
the statute in fact accomplished the legitimate state objective. 473 F.2d at 931.
22473 F.2d at 931, quoting from the oft-cited decision of McGowan v. Maryland,
366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961), where the Supreme Court defined the standard to be used
under the traditional "rational relationship" approach: "A statutory discrimination will
not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it."
23473 F.2d at 931. The court also declared that the individual plaintiffs who held
official positions had standing to sue the state on constitutional grounds. 473 F.2d at 933.
Its authority for so holding was Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968). This action
of the Second Circuit is consonant with a similar application of Allen in Aguayo v.
Richardson, 473 F.2d 1090, 1100 (2d Cir. 1973).
24473 F.2d at 932. This approach, placing an affirmative duty upon the state to
justify its use of certain classifications, represents a substantial departure from the
traditional "rational relationship" standard. However, the approach seems to be in line
with the direction of recent Supreme Court cases. See note 19 supra. See also Boraas v.
Village of Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1973), prob. juris. noted, 42 U.S.L.W. 3213
(U.S. Oct. 15, 1973) (No. 73-191), discussed at p. 372 supra; Aguayo v. Richardson, 473 F.2d
1090 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 42 U.S.L.W. 3406 (U.S. Jan. 15, 1974) (No. 72-1416),
discussed at p. 278 supra.
25411 U.S. 1 (1973). The San Antonio case involved a challenge, on equal protection
grounds, to the Texas system of school financing. Under the Texas system, a portion of
each district's operating expenses was paid by an ad valorem tax on property within
that district.
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"rational relationship" test formerly applicable where neither funda-
mental rights nor suspect classifications were involved. As a result of
the San Antonio decision, the future of the "sliding-scale" approach
delineated in Richardson is in doubt.26
Finally, the practical effects attending a decision of Richardson
must be considered. Invalidation of a public assistance program like
that outlined in the New York scheme is likely to wreak havoc on
similar plans in other states. The majority of the San Antonio Court
expressed an unwillingness to render a decision which would have such
a devastating effect.27
20 Perhaps the crux of the Court's position is best summarized by the dissenting
opinion of Justice Marshall. Justice Marshall chastized the majority for what he felt
to be a regression from the Court's position in earlier equal protection cases, criticizing
them for attempting
to establish today that the equal protection cases fall into one or two neat
categories which dictate the appropriate standard of review- strict scrutiny or
mere rationality. But this Court's decisions in the field of equal protection defy
such easy categorization.
411 U.S. at 98.
If indeed the San Antonio case has signaled a return to the so-called "two-tiered"
approach, it is apparent that the New York Social Services Law challenged in Richardson
would be subject merely to the "rational relationship" test. Under such a permissive stan-
dard of review, the statute cannot be said to be in violation of the equal protection
clause.
On the other hand, if the district court persists in the application of a more stringent
equal protection standard based on the Second Circuit's "sliding-scale" theory, a more
formidable challenge to the statutes in question will result. While one can only speculate
as to what justifications the state will offer in defense of its statutory scheme (since none
were offered to the Second Circuit), the Richardson court did indicate that certain
rationales would not be sufficient to sustain the statute. Among these, the court felt that
the program could not be justified "on the ground that it is designed to promote efficiency
of administration." 473 F.2d at 932.
The Second Circuit also seemed to foreclose any justification based on an attempt to
place New York City in a position of "fault" for having a disproportionately high per-
centage of public assistance recipients located within its boundaries. The court emphasized
that the City neither controls the welfare payment schedule throughout the state, nor
is empowered to "interfere with the rights of welfare recipients to travel interstate and
settle in New York City." 473 F.2d at 931-32, citing Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 US.
618 (1969).
27 Mr. Justice Powell, writing for the five-man majority, observed that,
[i]t cannot be questioned that the constitutional judgment reached by the
District Court and approved by our dissenting brothers today would occasion in
Texas and elsewhere an unprecedented upheaval in public education.
411 U.S. at 56. The Court went on to uphold the validity of the Texas school financing
system, applying the traditional "rational relationship" test, and declared that while,
[tihese practical considerations, of course, play no role in the adjudication of
the constitutional issues presented . . . they serve to highlight the wisdom of
the traditional limitations on this Court's function.
Id. at 58.
It should be noted that the district court will have no difficulty analogizing Richard-
son to San Antonio in that both cases involve questions of local taxation to raise funds
for local expenditure. Therefore, the district court will have open to it the same argu-
ment employed by the majority in San Antonio, namely that such questions are par-
ticularly within the expertise of the state legislature and the courts should refrain from
1973]
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On the other hand, however, one must not lose sight of the plight
of the New York City resident. The Supreme Court has declared that
durational residency requirements prerequisite to public assistance
constitute an abridgement of the constitutionally protected right of
freedom of interstate travel. 28 If, at the same time, the courts are will-
ing to uphold public assistance financing programs which require
geographic districts to pay a fixed percentage of their welfare expenses
without regard to the number of recipients within the districts, the
City's taxpayers, and all others in areas paying relatively high welfare
benefits, will be caught in a financial squeeze.
Responsibility for solving this complex problem now lies with the
three-judge district court and its decision promises to have far-reaching
consequences. Despite the Second Circuit's decision in Aguayo v.
Richardson,29 wherein an attack on the state's experimental welfare
programs was repulsed, Richardson is distinguishable on its facts.80 In
any event, the final resolution of this issue will lie with the Supreme
Court.81
AFFIRMATIVE DUTY To INTEGRATE APPLIED To EXCLUDE NON-WHITS
Otero v. New York City Housing Authority
Municipal authorities have an affirmative duty to integrate their
public housing. This responsibility derives from both the equal pro-
tection clause of the Constitution and the Fair Housing Act of 1968.1
interfering with local attempts at solving the problem. 14. at 53-55. But see Serrano v.
Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 97 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971); Note, Equal Educational
Opportunity: A Case for the Children, 46 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 280 (1971).
28 See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
29 473 F.2d 1090 (2d Cir. 1973); see pages 278-87 supra for detailed treatment of Aguayo.
80 In Aguayo the plaintiffs were attacking the implementation of two experimental
programs, id., while in Richardson the attack was aimed at the established and continu-
ing scheme. 473 F.2d at 930. While some latitude might be given to the states where
experimental programs are involved, such latitude seems inappropriate where an estab-
lished state scheme is questioned. Moreover, the Aguayo court was able to find that the
programs "suitably furthered" a legitimate state interest. 473 F.2d at 1109. In Richardson,
Judge Kaufman noted that the state "has not offered any rational justification" for the
scheme, nor was it perceivable "what justifying considerations may have motivated the
State legislature to devise a system that appears on the surface discriminatory." 473 F.2d
at 932.
81 Appeals from decisions of three-judge district courts are direct to the Supreme
Court as of right. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1970).
142 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. (1970). The Act contains a broad declaration stating: "It is
the policy of the United States to provide, within constitutional limitations, for fair
housing throughout the United States." 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1970). The Act also requires
the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to: "(5) administer the programs
and activities relating to housing and urban development in a manner affirmatively to
further the policies of this subchapter." 42 U.S.C. § 3608 (1970). Thus, the affirmative duty
[Vol. 48:262
